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Abstract 
Under what conditions do oppositional politicians in Western parliamentarian democracies repeat as 
candidates after losing their first election? Political leaders need to attain the highest executive offices 
to lead. But in most democracies this means that parties must previously select them as their candi-
dates for those offices. Parties' intervention in candidate selection is thus a vital part of the game. 
However, this is still an understudied topic in Western parliamentarian politics. A few studies have 
analyzed losers’ fate, but they have exclusively focused on the US case where party machines have 
played for long a lesser role in leadership recruitment. This paper seeks therefore to make a contribu-
tion to the literature about the current role of party organizations for political leadership survival in 
party-centered parliamentarian countries by studying the specific case of candidates for the presidency 
of the Spanish Comunidades Autonómas. 
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‘No se puede ser líder  
contra la organización de un partido’ 
Francisco Álvarez-Cascos2  
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Refering to Jose Borrell’s resignation as the Spanish socialist candidate for prime minister in 1999. 
Under what conditions do oppositional 
politicians in Western parliamentarian 
democracies repeat as candidates after 
losing their first election? In a time of 
“presidentialization” of politics and 
“cartelization” of parties, what “assets” 
do they need to control if they want to 
repeat the experience of throwing their 
hat into the electoral ring? Do party 
organizations still play any role, at least 
in the case of “New Democracies”, on 
their “durability” as nascent top leaders 
in front of electoral setbacks? 
Political leaders need to attain the high-
est executive offices to lead. But in 
most democracies this means that par-
ties must previously select them as their 
candidates for those offices. Parties' 
intervention in candidate selection is 
thus a vital part of the game. However, 
it seems that in current Western parlia-
mentarian democracies parties’ specific 
role on the “durability” of political 
leaders has changed. Thus controlling 
the party extraparliamentary organiza-
tion no longer protects political leaders 
from a bad electoral performance. 
However there are reasons to believe 
that this is not the case in the so-called 
    
      
     
         
       
    
      
      
that this is not the case in the so-called 
“New Democracies”. In these democra-
cies being entrenched in their party ap-
paratus still provides political leaders 
with a safety net in case of defeat. In 
any case, this is still an understudied 
topic in Western parliamentarian poli-
tics. A few studies have analyzed los-
ers’ fate, but they have exclusively fo-
cused on the US case where party ma-
chines have played for long a lesser role 
in leadership recruitment (Taylor and 
Boatright 2005, Carsey, Berry and For-
rest 2003, 2013). This paper seeks 
therefore to make a contribution to the 
literature about the current role of party 
organizations for political leadership 
survival in party-centered parliamentar-
ian countries, and how “New Democra-
cies” present particularities. 
In the next section we discuss the theo-
retical interest of studying what hap-
pens to those candidates for chief exec-
utive offices in parliamentarian democ-
racies who fail the first time they run. 
We focus especially on the potential 
consequences that both the “presiden-
tialization” of politics and the “carteli-
zation” of political parties have had on 
the traditional role party organizations 
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play in political leadership recruitment 
and survival, and why “New Democ-
racies” may present some peculiari-
ties. In section three we present our set 
of hypotheses to explain losers’ fate, 
as well as some methodological and 
measurement issues.  In section four 
we present the basic descriptive in-
formation about losers’ fate in the 
Spanish regions (Comunidades 
Autónomas), the “New Democracy” 
selected as case study.  In section five 
we offer the results of our empirical 
analysis. The final section provides 
some preliminary implications of our 
findings on the current role of party 
organizations in Spain on the generali-
zation of both the “presidentialization” 
and the “cartelization” thesis for 
Western parliamentarian democracies. 
 
2. The changing role of political parties in candidate      
recruitment and its consequences on the “durability” of      
political leaders in Western parliamentarian democracies 
We know that in the US citizens that 
run for legislative office are mainly 
white, middle-aged men, highly educat-
ed, from a high socioeconomic status, 
have an intense political ambition, and 
show strong partisanship (Fowler 1996, 
Herrnson 1997, Lawless 2012). These 
are also common features among West-
ern, parliamentarian countries (Norris 
1997, Hazan and Rahat 2010). And we 
know that this socio-demographic bias 
can be the result of two distinct pro-
cesses: self-selection, or supply side 
factors, and gate-keepers’ preferences, 
or demand-side factors (Norris 1997). 
We also know that we must be very 
careful in extrapolating how supply and 
demand-side factors interact in the US 
to other Western parliamentarian coun-
tries, characterized by strong, mass-
branch political organizations. In many 
“party-centered systems” 3 it may be 
                                                 
3 Originally the concepts of “party-centered” 
and “candidate-centered” systems referred ex-
simply wrong to frame the process of an 
individual ending up as a party’s legis-
lative candidate as a purely individual 
decision based on cost-benefit analysis 
pondered by the probability of winning. 
Referring to the Dutch case, Leijenaar 
and NieMöller (1997:125) suggested 
instead that “one more or less acci-
dentally ends up in the next party func-
tion [i.e. ‘being candidate’]”. 
However, it would be wrong, to think 
that US political parties play no role in 
candidate recruitment for legislatures. 
Even in this country, where candidates 
are mainly selected through primaries, 
political parties still play an important 
                                                                  
clusively to what citizens look at when making 
their vote decision: either the personal charac-
teristics of the individuals who run, or the char-
acteristics (ideological but not only) of the or-
ganization that has nominated them (Carey and 
Shugart 1995, Grofman 2005). Here we consid-
ered a broader role of parties in the electoral 
process, “from selecting candidates, to coordi-
nating campaigns, to presenting a choice of 
parties on the ballot paper” (Dalton, Farrell and 
McAllister 2011:46). 
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role in the nominating process. They do 
so by targeting specific individuals and 
providing them with different resources 
so that they can mount “their own” per-
sonal campaigns (Herrnson 1997, Mack 
1998, Lawless 2012). 
It is in the “how” parties play that role 
that makes the US quite distinct from 
many party-centered countries. In these 
countries the extraparliamentary party 
organization, or more precisely the 
“party central office” (Katz and Mair 
1993), matters because they have 
stronger control over the (re)selection 
process than in North America. In these 
countries the selection of candidates by 
primaries was until recently the excep-
tion (Scarrow et alt 2002). But it also 
matters because having a long record of 
voluntary working for the party organi-
zation, what is called “party service” in 
English, and “Ochsentour” in German, 
has traditionally been a requisite for 
being selected as a legislative candi-
date4. Through this process, potential 
elected officials are socialized into the 
party’s culture and practices (Dalton, 
Farrell and McAllister 2011:30), which 
guarantees their loyalty to the organiza-
tion and reduces “the need to utilize the 
available disciplinary measures – perks, 
career advancement, party whip, votes 
of confidence – in order to keep its 
elected representatives in line” (Hazan 
and Rahat 2010:148). 
                                                 
4 In Germany, it has been calculated that it takes 
on average about 10.5 years for a candidate to 
progress from his first local party office to first 
entering the Bundestag (Wessels 1997:87), in 
the Netherlands it takes five to ten years of 
party activities (Leijenaar and Niemöller 
1997:114). 
 
In brief, not only do party central office 
in Western parliamentarian countries 
have a tighter control over who will be 
their legislative candidates than in the 
US, but also candidates must be one of 
them, a party creature, to be nominated. 
Using Hazan and Rahat’s (2010) analyt-
ical framework, it is a question not only 
of the “selectorate” dimension, but also 
of the “candidacy” one. Outsiders, ama-
teurs, people whose “party service” has 
been poor are simply not welcome… 
unless one runs for the chief executive 
office in the last decades (Dalton, Far-
rell and McAllister 2011). Both the 
“presidentialization” of politics and the 
“cartelization” of parties sustain the 
expectation that parties organizations’ 
role on executive candidate recruitment 
and its implications for leadership sur-
vival has changed. 
Scholars have increasingly suggested 
that Western parliamentarian democra-
cies are experiencing a process of “pres-
identialization” (Poguntke and Webb 
2005, Bäck et al 2009). Although the 
term is still somewhat ambiguous, there 
is a general consensus that it means that 
there is a concentration of power around 
single political leaders holding execu-
tive public office. This goes hand in 
hand with a concomitant loss of power 
and autonomy of collective actors such 
as cabinets, parliaments and political 
parties. “Presidentialization”, we are 
told, encompasses change in three dis-
tinct political arenas: the electorate, the 
party organization, and the executive of 
the state (Poguntke and Webb 2005), of 
which the first two are salient for our 
argument. 
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Most studies on this “presidentializa-
tion” have focused so far on leaders’ 
effects on voting behaviour and the 
emergence of prime ministerial “candi-
date-centred” election campaigns 
(Poguntke and Webb 2005, Johansson 
and Tallber 2008). But Webb, Poguntke 
and Kolodny (2011) have recently sug-
gested that this process has also conse-
quences on leaders’ positions within 
their party organizations. They are pri-
marily interested in party leaders’ in-
creased autonomy versus their parties to 
establish party strategy and policy, as 
well as to select candidates for elective 
office. But they also suggest that it has 
involved a change in (1) parties’ re-
cruitment criteria of “political leaders”5, 
as well as in (2) their “durability” in 
front of electoral setbacks. 
Insofar to parties’ recruitment criteria, 
in the traditional mass party, obtaining 
the highest party’s central office –the 
party chairman – was thus the last step 
of a politician’s successful “Ochsen-
tour” career. In addition, these leaders 
were usually nominated as the party’s 
candidate for prime minister as the final 
“reward” for a whole life devoted to the 
organization, and thanks to a meticulous 
process of building a power base within 
the extraparliamentary organization 
(Ware 1996). Thus the party’s leader of 
the party’s central office tended also to 
be the leader of the so-called “party in 
public office” (Katz and Mair 2003)6. 
                                                 
5 We refer here specifically to the selection of 
party’s candidates for executive office, not the 
selection of the formal “party leader”, although 
in some parties both processes can go together. 
6 It is true that we have to make two qualifica-
tions. In some mass parties that had evolved 
But the party risked nominating dull 
candidates for prime ministers, expert 
only in winning negotiations in smoke-
filled rooms.  
At a time when parties were willing to 
sacrifice winning elections for ideologi-
cal purity, or people voted for ideologi-
cal or party attachment reasons, this was 
not such a serious problem7. But since 
the emergence of, first, the catch-all, 
and, later, cartel type of parties, these 
can no longer afford these selection 
criteria at a time when winning office is 
their paramount goal and the personal 
qualities of executive candidates is what 
electors, or at least the swing voters, 
seem to value most in their vote deci-
sion (Garzia 2011). 
Parties now seek to nominate candidates 
for chief executive office that, irrespec-
tive of their position within the internal 
party hierarchy or their record of party 
service and internal apprenticeship, they 
believe will give them the highest 
chances of improving election results. 
This means that “the principal criterion 
by which the prospective candidates are 
judged may prove to be electoral”, and, 
as a result, these candidates are ex-
pected to have a “limited party experi-
ence” and have “bypassed the usual 
party process to some extent” (Webb, 
                                                                  
from previous “cadre parties” the parliamentary 
wing had a much more important role in select-
ing “the party leader”. In others, in order to 
avoid a concentration of power in his hands if 
becoming prime minister, it was incompatible to 
hold at the same time both public and party 
offices. 
7 As a British voter declared in the 1950s: “I 
would vote for a pig if my party put one up” 
(Karvonen 2010:41). 
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Poguntke, and Kolodny 2011:10-13). 
Although these scholars do not suggest 
it explicitly, we can also expect that 
“being the party chairman” is no longer 
tantamount to “being the party’s candi-
date” for prime minister when elections 
are hold8.  
But this change in the “qualities” parties 
seek in their candidates for the highest 
executive office would also have deeper 
implications in the nature of politicians’ 
leadership. Among other consequences, 
these scholars maintain that the “dura-
bility” of the leaders chosen under these 
new criteria is more contingent upon 
their electoral fortune. According to 
them, “presidentialized party leaders 
(…) are less likely to survive electoral 
defeats than their precursors, who were 
safely entrenched in their parties” (p9), 
and “they may be dispensed with by the 
party, and replaced by an alternative 
with better electoral prospects” (p13). 
Candidates that are selected mainly for 
electoral reasons and, by leading to the 
party to an electoral defeat, have shown 
these reasons being wrong, or at least no 
longer true, will probably face a coali-
tion of both rank-and-file activists, dis-
appointed by ideological concerns, or 
for having lost the prospect of enjoying 
the spoils of politics, and fellow col-
leagues who see an opportunity to ob-
tain the next party nomination. In addi-
                                                 
8 Germany is again a good example. In 1998 
Gerhard Schroeder, and not the party chairman 
Oskar Lafontain, was the SPD candidate for 
chancellor. In 2002 Edmund Stoiber, and not the 
party chairman Angela Merkel, was the CDU 
candidate for chancellor. For the 2013 elections, 
the SPD have not chosen their party chairman as 
candidate for chancellor. 
tion, given that in parliamentarian sys-
tems it is impossible to vote for a par-
ty’s candidate for executive office while 
voting for a different party for the legis-
lative, executive candidates defeats are 
directly responsible for many legislative 
candidates’ failing to obtain or renew 
their seats. Internal rejection can come 
from all the “faces” of the political par-
ty: the party on the ground, the party’s 
central office and the party in public 
office. But if candidates are selected 
because of serving a lengthy apprentice-
ship in the party and counting on signif-
icant bases of support among internal 
party bosses, and therefore control the 
party apparatus where the results of the 
elections are evaluated, they are in a 
better position to control that evaluation 
as well as internal turmoil. 
Still, Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny 
were making here an explicit over-time 
comparison about the chances of lead-
ers’ survival after defeat. Can we trans-
form it into a “cross-sectional” one? 
Should we expect that current candi-
dates that still have a long record of 
party service and control the party ex-
traparliamentary organization have 
higher chances of being renominated if 
they fail than the new “presidentialized” 
type of candidates?  
The importance of being selected by the 
old rules was that those politicians who 
controlled the extraparliamentary organ-
ization, or at least who were “en-
trenched” in it, had the highest chances 
of being selected as candidates. But 
they survived electoral defeats because 
of that control, not because the selection 
 6 
 
criteria parties used per se. In this sense, 
we could even think that if by any rea-
son some present candidates, who are 
selected for their electoral appeal, have 
also worked their way up through the 
extraparliamentary organization − and 
become the chair of their party central 
office before getting their nomination9 − 
the latter feature could also protect them 
from party’s deception with their elec-
toral performance10. The real issue is, 
therefore, if controlling the extraparlia-
mentary organization still provides can-
didates with a “safety net”. It is here 
that the concomitant transformation of 
the Western parties may play an im-
portant role on our expectations. 
According to Katz and Mair (1995) 
some of the factors that have contribut-
ed to the “presidentialization of poli-
tics”, such as the “mediatization” of 
politics, the erosion of traditional socio-
political cleavages, or the growing 
complexity and reach of the state, 
alongside a simultaneous decline of 
citizens’ involvement in party organiza-
tions and an easier parties’ accessibility 
to state resources, have set the stage for 
the emergence of the new “cartel party” 
type. They are mostly characterized by 
what they do, behaving as a “cartel” to 
reduce the risk of losing access to state 
resources. But this new electoral behav-
ior has also consequences for their in-
                                                 
9 Let’s remember that Webb, Poguntke and 
Kolodny argue that it is no longer necessary to 
have this partisan background, not that it is 
incompatible with being electorally attractive. 
10Another issue is that candidates can be chair of 
the extraparliamentary organization without 
having a long record of party service and being 
entrenched within their parties. Later we explain 
how we solve this issue. 
ternal organization (Katz and Mair 
1995:17).  
Given that states’ subsides goes mainly 
to the “party in public office”, and that 
“the party on the ground” has a lesser 
role in campaigning, the “party central 
office” has lost the control of most of 
the resources necessary to winning of-
fice (Katz and Mair 2002). As a result, 
we could expect that nowadays control-
ling that party office, and being en-
trenched in their extraparliamentary 
organization, does not add any signifi-
cant protection to candidates from elec-
toral defeats. In other words, losers that 
are still the chairs of the party’s central 
office are not more likely to repeat than 
those who do not hold that extraparlia-
mentary office.  
Katz and Mair (1995:17) also consider 
that we can expect to find this “carteli-
zation” of parties especially for main-
stream political parties as well in those 
countries in which state support for par-
ties and its “colonization” by them is 
more pronounced as well as in those 
political cultures marked by a tradition 
of inter-party cooperation. In this sense, 
Van Biezen (2000) has also questioned 
that the argument of the decline of party 
central office can be applied to the case 
of so-called “New Democracies”11. For 
her this extraparliamentary organization 
is still the most important power centre 
within parties. In these relatively recent 
                                                 
11 We refer to those countries democratized 
since the mid 70s. It is arguable to still consider 
“new” democracies, some of them are already 
40 years old, but this is the term Van Biezen 
uses, and as we use her proposals, we keep this 
term. 
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democracies, because of weakly devel-
oped party loyalties and lack of party 
institutionalization, political leaders use 
the extraparliamentary organization to 
maintain the unity and discipline the 
party in public office when conflicts 
over party’s policy or goal appear (Van 
Biezen 2000:411).  
As a result, we could expect that in 
“New Democracies” controlling the 
party’s central office does still add sig-
nificant protection to candidates from 
electoral defeats. If this is so, Van 
Biezen’s argument makes us expect that 
in these countries losers that are current-
ly the chairs of the party’s central office 
are more likely to repeat than those who 
do not hold that extraparliamentary of-
fice. 
In sum, although the “cartelization” of 
parties further suggests that their extra-
parliamentary organization may have 
changed its role not only on the re-
cruitment of candidates for executive 
office, as advanced by the “presidential-
ization” thesis, but on the protection 
they can provide their political leaders 
from electoral setbacks as well, parlia-
mentarian “New Democracies” may 
have avoided this final transformation. 
As far as we know this hypothesis about 
the particularities of “New Democra-
cies” on the role of the extraparliamen-
tarian party organization on political 
leadership “durability” in front of elec-
toral setbacks has not been tested yet. In 
fact, of the three indicators that Van 
Biezen used, just two proved that the 
extraparliamentary organizations are 
still the most important power centre 
within parties.  
In order to test this hypothesis we are 
going to focus in this paper on those 
candidates for the premiership of the 
Spanish regional governments that did 
not win, referred here as “losers”.  We 
focus only on candidates who lose their 
elections because, as we can see, their 
fate is an excellent ground to assess the 
role political parties, and especially 
their extraparliamentarian organiza-
tions, may still have in party-centered 
parliamentarian systems for political 
leaders’ survival, and the nature of their 
power12.  
Moreover, if electoral defeats may af-
fect differentially those candidates that 
are “entrenched in their parties” and 
those who are not, this is something we 
can study empirically. We can build a 
pool of “losers”, some of them would 
have repeated as candidates while oth-
ers not, and we can analyze if any of 
their political and partisan traits explain 
this variation. For example, in our data-
base we found that around 56 per cent 
of losers only run once and 44 per cent 
were “repeaters”, as well as 61 per cent 
were chair of the extraparliamentary 
organizations and 39 per cent were not 
at the moment of their first, and for 
many, only contest.  
                                                 
12 We do not mean that the political career of 
candidates for the premiership who are not re-
nominated is permanently over. Many of them 
continue in politics in other public offices (Wil-
liam Hague in the UK or Joaquín Almunia in 
Spain are good examples). 
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In addition, inspired by the only two 
studies about losers’ fate (Taylor and 
Boatright 2005, Carsey, Berry and For-
rest 2013), we will study only “first-
time losers”, that is those who run for 
an elective office for their first time, and 
lost, which are normally, but not al-
ways, oppositional candidates13. This 
means that we focus on leadership sur-
vival at a critical moment of their top 
level political career, their initial stages. 
Moreover, the advantage of focusing 
exclusively on “first-time losers” is to 
control the fact that the previous num-
ber of times a candidate has run, either 
as incumbent or from the opposition, 
can influence the chances of repeating 
again. 
Spain seems to be a good case study for 
the role of party organization on losers’ 
survival. First of all, Spain is a “New 
Democracy”, whose current parliamen-
tary monarchy was established in its 
new constitution of 1978, after Franco’s 
death in 1975. Secondly, the “presiden-
tialisation” of politics, the trigger of 
these changes on parties’ recruitment 
criteria and the durability of political 
leaders, is said to be present in this 
country since the reestablishment of 
democracy (Picarella 2009). The Span-
ish Constitution is said to have adopted 
for the national and regional levels of 
governments the so-called “Chancellor-
ship” parliamentarism, and Spanish 
                                                 
13 Some politicians are first time candidates for 
a specific public office while already incum-
bents (Gerald Ford in 1976 is a good example), 
but this is not the common pattern. In our study 
we found that around 7 percent of our first-time 
candidates for executive office already hold that 
office. 
prime ministers and regional premiers 
have mostly been powerful figures (Van 
Biezen and Hopkin 2005, Aja 1999). In 
addition, Spanish party system presents 
features typical of an intense carteliza-
tion of parties. In fact this country has 
been considered to be a “parties’ state” 
whose core institutions of government 
have been colonized by parties, which 
are therefore supported more from 
above than bellow (Holliday 2002).  
Notwithstanding all this, Van Biezen 
analysis also shows that if we look more 
in detail to particular aspects of the rela-
tionship between the party central office 
and the party in public office, mainly 
how the Spanish parties themselves de-
fine the relationship between these to 
two faces, and the rules and practice of 
party financing, what we find is “the 
remarkably powerful status of the party 
central office and the particular strong 
position of the party executive” (Van 
Biezen, 2000:409). Therefore, Spain 
should be a good place to assess the role 
parties’ extraparliamentarian organiza-
tion may still have for political leaders’ 
survival. 
However, studying the national politics 
of just one country has an insurmounta-
ble hindrance: a very little number of 
cases. Given that, as we will see, we 
have to control for other factors, we 
have more explanatory variables than 
cases. Fortunately, one of the ways to 
increase the number of observations 
relevant to our theory is studying subna-
tional units (King, Keohane and Verba 
1994, 217). Obviously, studying region-
al politics has its own implications: 
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firstly, the role of regional elections as 
of a second-order type (Reif and 
Schmitt 1980), secondly, given that we 
are studying the role of party organiza-
tion on the recruitment process, party’s 
vertical distribution of power can alter 
the process of re-nomination. Later we 
comment on how these characteristics 
may affect the chances of losers repeat-
ing again. 
 
3. Variables and hypothesis: methodological and         
measurement issues 
3.1. Our dependent variable: 
losers’ running again or not 
As explained, our dependent variable is 
whether an opposition candidate for the 
premiership of the Spanish Comuni-
dades Autónomas who “lost” his first 
contest repeats in the next regional elec-
tions as his party’s candidate (coded 1), 
or not (coded 0)14.  
But what does “losing an election” 
mean in a parliamentarian regime? In 
other words, what candidates for execu-
tive office can be considered “losers” 
and which are “winners”? In a presiden-
tial system after the polls are closed and 
the votes have been counted, it is (al-
most) certain who will become the next 
president and, therefore, what candidate 
has won the elections. In parliamentari-
an systems, after the polls close and 
votes are counted, if no party, or pre-
electoral coalition of parties, has ob-
tained an absolute majority of legisla-
                                                 
14 For politically correctness it is now common 
practice to use the feminine to refer to individu-
al candidates. However, as we are studying 
“losers”, we prefer to avoid this practice in 
order not to suggest this as a concern specifical-
ly for women. 
 
tors, this is just the beginning of the 
game (Budge 1990). One can be the 
most voted candidate, with a plurality of 
MPs, and still be left in opposition.  
So our first definition of a “winner” 
(and therefore a “loser”) is that the can-
didate for executive office, irrespective 
of whether he is the candidate of the 
most voted party (or the party who ob-
tained the highest number of legisla-
tors), becomes prime-minister in the 
first government formed after the elec-
tions. All candidates that do not become 
prime-ministers, or in our case regional 
premier, are “losers”. 
But another feature of parliamentarian 
regimes, their collective nature, makes 
things a bit more complex. Let’s think 
about this real example obtained from 
some Spanish regional elections. For the 
elections of 2003 in Cantabria, the re-
gional branch of the Spanish socialists 
presented a new candidate, Lola Gorosti-
aga, for the regional premiership. The 
Socialist Party, except for a brief period at 
the beginning of the 90s, had never been 
in power in that region. After the 2003 
elections, the PSOE ended, again, as the 
second most voted party. The most voted 
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party − the Spanish Conservatives (PP) − 
again, did not obtain an absolute majority. 
The previous government had been a coa-
lition formed by the PP, which held the 
presidency, and a small party, the PRC 
(the Cantabrian regionalists), the third 
party of the region in number of votes and 
legislators. But after the elections, 
Gorostiaga proposed to the PRC the for-
mation of a coalition, offering them the 
presidency of the regional government. 
The Cantabrian regionalists accepted her 
offer, and she became vice-premier of the 
next regional government. Can she be 
regarded as a “loser”? We doubt it. But 
according to our first definition she was. 
In this Cantabrian case, the PSOE man-
aged to enter the regional government. 
Should we then consider all candidates 
whose parties are not able to enter the 
government as “losers”? Let’s think, for a 
moment, about candidates of small parties 
who have no real option of becoming the 
next regional premier, and whose party 
has no previous legislators, but that man-
age to obtain a seat for themselves, and 
perhaps other colleagues. Will they be 
regarded as “losers” by their own party? 
The appraisal they usually receive makes 
us doubt it. So we could consider as 
“winners” all candidates for executive 
office whose party enters the first gov-
ernment formed after the election, or, if 
the party has never held legislative seats, 
managed to obtain (or retain) their seat. 
The “losers” will be all those who do not 
follow this definition. 
Which definition of “loser” is better? If 
our first definition is perhaps too broad 
(because of the strict definition of who 
is the winner), and we are considering 
as losers candidates who were actually 
regarded as winners by their own par-
ties, our second definition is perhaps too 
narrow, and we are considering as win-
ners candidates who were actually re-
garded as losers by their parties. As a 
result, we must decide whether we pre-
fer to commit the error of including 
some winners within our losers’ pool 
(type I), or the error of excluding some 
of the losers from our pool (type II). We 
choose to take a cautious stance here 
and avoid the type-I error. The second 
definition gives us the highest probabil-
ity of studying only losers, at the risk of 
excluding some of them, and at the cost 
of reducing the number of our cases15. 
3.2. Our main independent var-
iable: being “party chairman” 
Earlier we argued that if Katz and 
Mair’s thesis about the cartelization of 
political parties was right, we should 
not find that those candidates still “en-
trenched in their parties” have a higher 
probability of surviving an electoral 
defeat than those who are not, whether 
they were selected because of their pre-
vious party service or for being a poten-
tial electoral asset. On the other hand, 
Van Biezen argues that a specific fea-
ture of the cartelization, the decline of 
the party’s central office, does not apply 
in the case of “New Democracies”. 
Therefore, in the case of Spain we 
should find that those “entrenched can-
                                                 
15 We have also checked if the results varied 
according to the definition used, they do not, but 
in the paper we only report results from our 
second definition. 
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didates” do have a higher probability of 
surviving. 
As a proxy of being “entrenched in their 
parties” we study if the candidate is a 
“party leader” or not. It is true that this 
proxy can be problematic. In some par-
ties it may just be a traditional formality 
to select previously as chair of that ex-
traparliamentary office their next candi-
date for the chief executive office, even 
if they have just arrived in politics as 
well as in the party. We cannot say that 
these candidates, even though being the 
party leaders, are “entrenched in their 
parties”. We are going to see later, 
however, that this is not the case of the 
Spanish regional governments. Still, we 
are studying “party leaders”, but who is 
a “party leader”? 
This term is ill-defined in the current par-
ty literature. Many scholars simply give 
no definition. Therefore we have decided 
to focus on “formal party leaders” (mean-
ing that party leaders must hold an office 
within the party structure). In addition, in 
countries like Spain, the office they hold 
is the highest within the party’s “central 
office” extraparliamentary organization 
(Katz and Mair 1993), or more precisely 
the chair of a “top-level body in charge of 
day-to-day political and organizational 
leadership” (Poguntke 1998:164). Finally, 
in order to mitigate possible endogeneity 
problems, such as candidates’ continua-
tion as party chairmen depends on their 
first contest electoral results, we study if 
candidates hold this internal party office 
only at the moment of running for their 
first time.  
Hypothesis: losers are more likely to 
repeat if they are party chairmen than 
not at the time of their first contest. 
3.3. Other explanatory variables 
In our explanation of why electoral de-
feats may affect the chances of political 
leaders of being renominated as candi-
dates we have hold so far two assump-
tions that are debatable: (1) that losers 
themselves will wish to run again, and 
that (2) they will have to defeat other 
possible aspirants. We have thus studied 
and classified other possible factors that 
may explain losers’ repetition according 
to this, and we should control for their 
impact. But we must always keep in 
mind that some of them may refer to 
both aspects. For example, a bad elec-
toral performance can affect politicians’ 
self-esteem, and at the same encourage 
the emergence of internal rivals. 
3.3.1. Will losers want to repeat their 
experience of running? 
So far we have assumed that candidates 
who lose their elections do seek to re-
peat again in the next contest, but we 
know this assumption is debatable even 
for incumbents, so they won in their last 
contest (Fisher and Herrick 2002, 
Wolak 2007). So, following what is 
common practice in the study of incum-
bents’ retirement and the groundbreak-
ing studies about losers’ renomination, 
we have controlled, first, for personal 
characteristics highlighted by the so-
called “psychological” tradition about 
candidate recruitment such as “political 
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ambition” (Fowler 1996; Herrnson 
1997, Taylor and Boatright 2005)16. 
Political ambition and office holding 
experience 
Politics is a dirty business, the brother 
of the famous Roman statesman Marcus 
T. Cicero reminded him when he was 
competing for the consulship of the 
Roman Republic17. It is dirty and bur-
densome. As a result running a cam-
paign requires a high level of commit-
ment, and candidates must have a strong 
desire for the potential benefits they 
obtain if they win to compensate for 
these costs (Fowler 1996:432). Given 
that, those who possess a high degree of 
ambition will be more willing to repeat 
their contestation experience. 
Studying individuals’ political ambition 
is not easy. But, given that usually get-
ting to the highest office means politi-
cians have passed through “minor offic-
es”, the literature suggests that political 
ambition and office holding experience 
are linked (Taylor and Boatright, 
2005:602). As a result we use as proxy 
of political ambition the number of 
years between candidates holding their 
first elective office (at any level) and 
their first contest for the executive pub-
lic office. Our concrete expectation is: 
Hypothesis: losers are more likely to 
repeat the higher the number of years 
they have held in elective office (at any 
                                                 
16 Following common practice we have also 
controlled for losers’ age. 
17 Quintus T. Cicero, ‘Commentariolum Peti-
tionis’ (‘Little handbook on electioneering’). 
 
level) at the time of their first contest for 
executive office. 
But psychological factors are not the 
only ones that can explain politicians’ 
own decision to run or not to run again. 
In their personal cost-benefit analysis 
they can also gauge their chances of 
winning depending on how the political 
and economic context, at the time of the 
next elections, affects those chances 
(Wolak 2007, Taylor and Boatright 
2005). 
Public perception of the national gov-
ernment 
Now, because we are studying regional, 
second order elections (Reif and 
Schmitt 1980), voters may use these 
elections to have a mid-term say on the 
performance of the national govern-
ment. Therefore our regional losers’ 
chances of winning the next elections 
will be affected by citizens’ positive 
(negative) perception of the national 
incumbents (Carsey and Wright 1998). 
Our concrete hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis: the higher the national 
prime ministerial approval at the time 
of the next elections, the higher the 
probability of a loser belonging to a 
party in national government running 
again, and the lower the probability of a 
loser that belongs to a party that is not 
in national government doing so. 
The performance of the regional econ-
omy 
There is substantial debate on how the 
economy affects electoral results. The 
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economic voting model suggests that 
governments are punished (rewarded) 
for bad (good) economic conditions at 
election time. However, the fact that we 
are dealing with a multilevel context 
may again alter significantly on whether 
the economic voting model still holds. 
First, the “clarity of responsibility 
amendment” points out that when the 
characteristics of the domestic political 
context make it difficult for citizens to 
apportion responsibility for economic or 
policy decision to particular actors, the 
connection between vote and the eco-
nomic performance may be highly re-
duced. The presence of multilevel gov-
ernance may be one of these features 
(Anderson 2006). 
Second, assuming that the public still 
holds politicians accountable for eco-
nomic results, we should specify the 
level of “economic performance” that 
citizens will look at (regional or national 
levels), and which politicians are held 
accountable (the national or the regional 
ones). Anderson’s answers to these two 
issues are, first, that the public will take 
into account the economic results at the 
regional level, and, second, will hold 
regional politicians accountable for those 
results, either because they are credited 
as directly responsible for them, or be-
cause they are used again as a way to 
show (dis)approval “of the performance 
of the national government in a subna-
tional election” (Anderson 2006:451). 
This means that losers that belong to the 
party or parties in national government 
will be encouraged to run again by a 
strong regional economy, and those 
whose party is in opposition at the na-
tional level will be discouraged from 
doing so. We test this assertion using as 
a proxy the evolution of regional unem-
ployment rate, given by the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística, between losers’ 
first elections and the next ones. 
Hypothesis: the higher the increase of 
the regional unemployment level, the 
lower the probability of a loser belong-
ing to a party in the national govern-
ment running again, and the higher the 
probability of a loser belonging to a 
party that is not in national government 
doing so. 
Opportunity windows: the type of re-
gional cabinet 
Another context factor that may also 
affect losers’ desire to run again is a 
specific peculiarity of our type of dem-
ocratic regime. One of the central dif-
ferences between parliamentarian and 
presidential regimes is that prime minis-
ters and governments can be changed 
without a vote being casted (Lijphart 
2012, Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). 
This means that, depending on the type 
of government formed after an election, 
losers can become winners, before new 
elections are called. If a defeat is not 
necessarily seen as definitive this can in 
turn influence their willingness to con-
tinue in politics and, finally, run again. 
To make it simple we distinguish here 
between single-party majority cabinets 
and other situations: 
Hypothesis: losers are more likely to 
repeat when no single party has an ab-
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solute majority after their first election 
than when it does. 
3.3.2. If they want it, will it be diffi-
cult to get the nomination again? 
So far we have also been assuming that, 
irrespective of a loser’s desire to repeat 
or not, obtaining the next nomination 
will be a highly contested issue. That is 
why being party chairman puts a candi-
date in a better position to defeat other 
aspirants to the party’s nomination. 
However, the groundbreaking studies 
by Taylor and Boatright (2005) and 
Carsey, Berry and Forrest (2013) about 
a loser’s fate give at least two reasons 
why this assumption may be in some 
cases unrealistic: (1) a poor electoral 
perspective for a given party may mean 
nobody wants to be its next candidate, 
and the party painfully seeks for what 
has been called a “sacrificial lamb”, or 
(2) parties are so satisfied with the elec-
toral results obtained under their “los-
ers” that nobody dares to challenge their 
re-nomination if they decide to run 
again.  
Losers’ share level 
Some competing parties may have a 
very small chance of “winning the elec-
tions” (Taylor and Boatright 2005). In 
these situations the problem is not to 
choose between aspirants, but to find 
anyone who would accept to run. How-
ever, Carsey et al (2013:13) suggest that 
“a party is likely to look at the loser in 
the previous race as a potential sacrifi-
cial lamb”. Equally, when the losing 
party gets very good results these schol-
ars also expect losers to run again be-
cause the party has a good chance of 
winning the next elections without re-
placing its candidate. It is at intermedi-
ate levels when the prospect the loser 
has a challenger for the next nomination 
increases. As a result, these scholars 
argue, and their data confirm it, that we 
should not expect a linear relationship, 
but a “U-shape” curve, between a par-
ty’s probability of winning and the 
probability of a loser running again. 
These authors and others (Taylor and 
Boatright  2005) consider that “the sin-
gle best measure of a potential chal-
lenger’s perceived probability of win-
ning office if he were to compete is the 
losing party’s vote share in the previous 
election” (Ibid, 2013:7). The adaptation 
of Carsey, Berry and Forrest to the 
Spanish context generates this hypothe-
sis18: 
Hypothesis: As a losing party’s vote 
share increases from zero, the probabil-
ity that the party will re-nominate the 
losing candidate for the next elections 
decreases until reaching a vote share in 
the middle point between zero and 0.50; 
as a losing party’s vote share increases 
from this point, the probability of the 
losing candidate being re-nominated 
increases. 
 
 
                                                 
18 In fact, their argument is more complex than 
this since they study three situations: (a) a party 
presents no candidate, (b) a party presents the 
previous loser, (c) a party presents a new candi-
date. Given that we do not have the first situa-
tion, we simplify their analysis in a loser run-
ning again or not. 
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Electoral evolution under the loser 
In the previous hypothesis the probabil-
ity of winning the next elections was a 
party’s probability, independent of the 
actual candidate they nominate. But, at 
the same time, parties can consider that 
their defeated candidates have also their 
own probability to win, or at least to 
improve the party’s electoral results, if 
they are renominated. A party can con-
sider that it has good chances of win-
ning the next election, but not with its 
previous candidate. Or that these chanc-
es depend on that candidate. Again, the 
issue is how parties gauge the impact of 
their candidates in their results, how 
they know if they are good or bad for 
them. Following anecdotic evidence of 
post elections party reactions as well as 
inspired by the study by Andrews and 
Jackman (2008), we suggest that they 
look at their “electoral evolution”. That 
is, we compare a party’s results with its 
losers, in time ‘t’, with previous results, 
in ‘t-1’19, under a different candidate 
(remember that we are studying only 
first-time losers). In addition, we do not 
look at absolute but relative increases. 
A five-point percentage increase can 
have quite a different meaning when the 
previous vote share was seven points 
that when it was 4020.   
                                                 
19 Probably it would be better to compare the re-
sults in ‘t’ with the results forecasted by the pre-
electoral surveys, but this option is not feasible. 
20 Here we do not find here any reason to be-
lieve there will be a “U-shape” relation between 
electoral evolution and the probability of a loser 
running again. When a party has suffered a 
drastic reduction in its vote share, most party 
members will probably think that anyone but the 
loser should be their next candidate. 
 
Hypothesis: losers are more likely to 
repeat the more positive in relative 
terms the electoral evolution of the par-
ty is under their candidacy. 
3.3. Degree of regional autono-
my and temporal dimension  
Finally we cannot forget that we are 
studying regional politics. This level of 
government can have its own peculiari-
ties that we should take into account 
(Jeffery 2008). For example, some of 
our parties have a multi-level structure 
with different degrees of “self-rule” for 
their regional branches. In some parties, 
the regional organization can be highly 
autonomous on selecting its candidates 
for regional premier. In others they may 
have to accept the “suggestions” re-
ceived from their national colleagues. 
This variable is important to be included 
in our model because it could explain the 
association between being party leader 
and losers’ repetition. When regional 
party branches’ self-rule is low, regional 
losers’ fate is decided by their national 
leaders. And perhaps they select their 
favorite “henchmen” in the regions, first 
as chairmen of the party branch, and 
later, when elections are called, as “can-
didates” for the regional premiership. As 
a result, if national leaders want them to 
repeat, in spite of losing, they will do so, 
not because they hold that party office, 
but because of their connection with the 
national party leaders.  
Given that there is no equivalent to a 
“Regional Authority Index” (Hooghe, 
Marks and Schakel 2010) for political 
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parties, we have used as proxies, first, 
the regional institutional score for the 
“self-rule” dimension at the time of a 
candidate’s first election, under the as-
sumption that there is a connection be-
tween the degree of “self-rule” of politi-
cal institutions and that of the regional 
branches of state-wide parties21. We 
have also included in the analysis 
whether the state-wide party of the re-
gional candidate was in office at the 
national level. Being in the national 
government is usually presented as a 
factor that weakens regional branches of 
state-wide parties and strengthens na-
tional leaders (Fabre 2008).  
Every party has its own “particularities” 
that may potentially affect losers’ 
chances of repetition. In consequence, 
we have built four dummy variables 
(PSOE, PP, IU, and non-state wide par-
ties), and left the PSOE as the reference 
category. As an analysis of party stat-
utes show, in the two main Spanish 
state-wide parties, the PSOE and the PP, 
the national headquarters have, at least 
formally, the final say in nominating a 
candidate22. This body, acting above the 
regional level, does not exist in the case 
of non-state wide parties, or it has a 
much smaller influence in the case of 
the leftist Izquierda Unida. In addition, 
controlling for the effect of IU is rele-
                                                 
21 For non-state wide parties we have assigned 
them the highest score possible. 
22 It may seem surprising that we have not in-
cluded a variable referring how candidates are 
formally selected. The reason is simple: there is 
almost no variation. The normal way for candi-
dates to be selected is by the executive bodies of 
the parties at any given Comunidad Autonóma. 
The use of primaries has been so far almost 
irrelevant. 
vant not only because of its higher de-
gree of internal self-rule, but because of 
other particularities such as its small 
size, its higher concern for “program-
matic purity” over “office” (reflected in 
its rejection of the offers to enter into 
several regional governments), a higher 
use of internal members referenda to 
decide strategic issues, etc. 
Finally we have also introduced a two-
period dummy variable to control for 
the consolidation of the new regional 
institutions created after the return of 
democracy in Spain as well as party 
regional branches. The first period is 
from the first regional elections hold 
from the beginning of the 1980s to the 
end of 1993. In 1993, regional govern-
ments were at least 10 years old and the 
last “Autonomic Pacts” to speed up the 
decentralization process, signed by the 
PSOE and the PP, started to be imple-
mented. The second period is from the 
beginning of 1994 until the last regional 
elections. Given the limited number of 
cases, it was not advisable to introduce 
more time periods. 
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4. Descriptive data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Main characteristics of candidates who run for their first time  23 
 
Men (%)        90.6 (N: 276) 
Age (mean of years)      44.9 (N: 265) 
Years affiliated to their party (mean of years)  14.9 (N: 209) 
Years holding a public office (mean of years)  9.2 (N: 272)  
Already party chairman (%)     60.5 (N: 276) 
Already party chairman by parties (%): 
 PP       58.7 (N: 75) 
 PSOE       54.5 (N: 77) 
 IU       68.1 (N: 91) 
 PANE       57.6 (N: 33) 
First-timers already in power  (%)    8.7 (N: 276)24 
Candidate party at National government (%)  23.9 (N: 276) 
Candidate selected by primaries (%)    4.3 (N: 276)  
First time, oppositional losers, first definition (%)  84.9 (N: 252)  
First time, oppositional losers, second definition (%) 76.2 (N: 252) 
 
25 
                                                 
23 It is also important to clarify what we have done with the “Arenas’ syndrome”. The first time Javier 
Arenas run as the PP candidate for the premiership of Andalusia was in 1994. He lost, but run again two 
years later, and lost again. In 2008 he was again the conservative candidate. He lost again, and run again 
in 2012 (and lost again). We have only studied the first time Arenas lost in 1994, because we only select-
ed losers that were “first-timers”. In any case, there are no more than 10 candidates that repeated in non-
consecutive elections.  
24 And 6.9% were already regional premier they first time they run. 
We have studied all the main state-wide 
parties (PSOE, AP-PP, PCE-IU), and 
those regional parties that have had a 
constant parliamentary representation 
since its foundation23. We have ana-
lyzed all the regional elections for each 
of the 17 Spanish regions (Comuni-
dades Autonómas) from the early 1980s 
up to 2012. That means that we have 
504 candidates, but only 276 different 
individuals because many of them run 
more than once (on average a person 
        
        
      
     
       
      
     
  
        
     
        
      
       
     
       
     
     
        
      
    
      
     
   
      
   
      
         
    
      
     
has run as a candidate 1.8 times). In 
order to build our dataset we have used 
the information from a variety of 
sources: party and public websites, re-
view of the Spanish press (mainly El 
País, El Mundo, La Vanguardia, and 
ABC), parties’ internal documents, and 
scholarly books. 
In order to have a better idea of these 
individuals, we present their main fea-
tures at the time of their first contest24. 
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Table 2: Electoral characteristics of their parties and percentage of losers (Second defini-
tion only) 
 Mean electoral results   Losers (%)1  Losers (%)2 
PP   29.3   69.0  25.3 
PSOE   31.6   73.0  25.3 
IU   6.1   87.9  40.4 
NSWP   17.0   63.0  9.1 
 
1 Percentage of candidates of every party that fails. 2 Party affiliation of losers. 26 27 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
25 It is also important to take into account again that our candidates who were party chairmen were not 
newcomers when they arrived at the top of the regional organization. On average, they had been previous-
ly affiliated for 12 years. And ¾ of them had been affiliated for more than 5 years, around half of them 
more than 10 years, and 1/3 for more than 15 years (data not shown). 
26 A cursory view of national politics shows that this is not a specific regional pattern. Just three against 
seven losers belonging to the state-wide parties did not repeat. 
27 The difference between state-wide and non-state wide parties is not statistically significant. 
Our executive candidates are not atypi-
cal. Like legislative candidates, they are 
middle-aged men, had been affiliated to 
their parties for around 15 years and 
had a public office experience of around 
10 years. They are not newcomers, nei-
ther to politics nor to the parties that 
nominated them. Most of them were 
party chairmen, but in every party a 
substantial amount of them were not25. 
Most of them were not in power, and 
only around a quarter belonged to a 
party who was at the national govern-
ment when the elections took place. 
        
   
        
      
      
      
       
      
        
        
        
   
         
     
        
      
       
     
       
     
     
        
     
    
     
     
   
      
     
And, of course, most of them lost in 
their first race. 
The first column of Table 2 shows the 
mean vote share of their political par-
ties. The second column shows the pro-
portion of opposition first time losers 
each party has had, and the third col-
umn shows the proportion of these los-
ers that belong to a given political party. 
We must retain that almost 42 per cent 
of our losers belong to a single party, 
Izquierda Unida.  
As we drop the losers of the last elec-
tions in every Comunidad Autónoma 
since we do not know if they will repeat 
or not, we have 173 cases according to 
our second definition. How many of 
them did repeat? Table 3 shows that in 
Spain more than 40 per cent of our los-
ers had at least a second chance. We are 
       
       
      
         
      
 
ers had at least a second chance. We 
are not studying a rare event26. In addi-
tion, Table 4 shows that among the 
three national parties, the party of affil-
iation of more than 90 per cent of our 
losers, there are no significant differ-
ences27.  
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Table 3: Percentage of repeaters and quitters 
Repeat   43.4 (N: 75) 
Did not repeat  56.6 (N: 98) 
Total   100 (N: 173) 
 
Table 4: Percentage of repeaters by political party 
 
 
 
Total Not repeat Repeat 
 PP  28 20 48 
 58.3% 41.7% 100.0% 
PSOE  22 18 40 
 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
IU  43 27 70 
 61.4% 38.6% 100.0% 
NSW
P 
 5 10 15 
 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
Total  98 75 173 
 56.6% 43.4% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Percentage of losers that repeats across CAs 
 
However, Graph 1 does show a varia-
tion across CAs. Some seem to be 
harsher than others with their losers. 
This is something we have to take into 
 
account. Finally, with regards to a tem-
poral dimension (Graph 2), there is no 
significant pattern either. 
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Graph 2: Percentage of losers that repeat s across time 
 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
To test the hypothesized relations, giv-
en that our dependent variable is binary 
(a loser repeats or doesn’t) we con-
ducted a logit model. Now, the residu-
als for all losers within a Comunidad 
Autónoma are likely to be correlated 
with each other, and the variance of the 
residuals is likely not to be constant 
across CAs (Carsey and Wright 1998). 
To correct this we have used robust 
estimates of the standard errors, clus-
tering by CA (Primo, Jacobsmeier and 
Milyo 2007). This is a standard proce-
dure, and it is used by the two unique 
studies about losers’ fate (Taylor and 
Boatright 2005, and Carsey, Berry and 
Forrest 2013). 
Our relatively small number of cases 
does not allow us include all our varia-
bles in one single model. Thus, we have 
developed three models. In the first 
model we want to know whether the 
effect of being party chairman (the main 
variable we are interested in) on the 
likelihood of repeating as candidate is 
altered by any given party, vertical 
power relations, or the time period. In 
the second model we have now included 
those variables related to the issue if a 
loser will want to run again (because of 
age, ambition, or a favorable political 
and economic context). Model 3 con-
trols now for the issue of how difficult 
may be being re-nominated. In this 
model we have also tried to test the hy-
pothesis about the “U-shape” relation-
ship between the past electoral share of 
a loser’s party and the probability of 
repeating. 
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Table 6: Factors explaining loser’s running again 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 1.104 (1.62) 4.224 (2.80) -3.779 (1.941) 
Party-chairman 
Age 
Office holding experience  
Unemployment increase 
  Unemp.*Party at nat. Gov. 
Valoration national PM 
  Val PM*Party at national gov. 
Type of regional gov. 
Share 
  Share2 
Relative electoral evolution 
Party at national gov. 
Degree of ‘self-rule’ 
PP-dummy 
IU-dummy  
NSWP-dummy 
Period 
1.509 (.26)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.036 (.48) 
-.281 (.14)** 
.045 (.47) 
-.507 (.54) 
1.248 (.66) 
.834 (.35)** 
1.268 (.358)*** 
-.045 (.029) 
-.007 (.035) 
.005 (.040) 
-.133 (.072) 
.015 (.329) 
-.435 (.315) 
-.078 (.452) 
- 
- 
- 
2.185 (1.404) 
-.333 (.202) 
-.503 (.698) 
-.665 (.716) 
1.170 (1.064) 
.846 (.787) 
1.616 (.380)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
.074 (.066) 
-.000 (.001) 
.010 (.004)** 
-.183 (.543) 
-.039 (.178) 
.192 (.521) 
.635 (.780) 
1.78 (.878)** 
.882 (.446)** 
    
Pseudo R2 
N 
.13 
170 
.15 
156 
.18 
164 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***p < .01, **p < .05 
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The first substantive finding is that no 
matter the model we use being the 
chairman of the extraparliamentary or-
ganization has a positive effect on the 
likelihood of repeating in the following 
election. In our first model we can see 
this effect does not seem to be the prod-
uct of a specific political party, espe-
cially not the effect of the party that has 
a clear overrepresentation of losers. The 
vertical distribution of power or the 
temporal dimension does not alter this 
relationship either. It also seems that 
losers are more prone to repeat in our 
second time period, when the regional 
democratic institutions were already 
around 10 years old. 
Our second model shows this happens 
no matter the age of the candidate, his 
number of years in elected public offic-
es, if the economic and political context 
is more or less favorable to running 
again, as well as the type of regional 
cabinet. 
Our third model again shows the sali-
ence of being party chair. This model 
also shows other interesting findings: 
first, the relative evolution of the party 
under the loser’s first contest does seem 
to have an effect on his chances of re-
peating: the higher the electoral vote 
increases (in relative terms), the higher 
the loser’s chances of repeating. This 
seems to suggest that under certain cir-
cumstances losers do not have to fight 
to get their renomination. If they lose, 
but the party is happy with them, they 
repeat at least a second time. Still this 
variable does not eliminate the effect of 
being party chair. But, there is no “U” 
relationship. Spain may be loser-
friendly, but their losers do not accept 
being “sacrificial lambs”28. Finally, 
losers that belong to non-state wide par-
ties have a higher likelihood of repeat-
ing than losers that belong to PSOE, our 
state-wide party taken as reference 
group. This seems to suggest that hav-
ing a level of national party leaders 
above our losers does affect their likeli-
hood of repeating, and in a negative 
sense. It also seems that the time period 
again matters. 
We are now on better grounds to con-
clude that the suggestion posited by Van 
Biezen was still right. Being party 
chairman does affect the likelihood of a 
first-time loser repeating as a candidate, 
but also improves electoral results.  
In order to have a more substantive idea 
of what this means we have calculated 
the predicted probabilities of being par-
ty chairman and not being so, holding 
the rest of the variable of our second 
model at their means. In the first case 
the probability is 54.8 per cent, in the 
second case a mere 19.4 per cent. This 
means that the probability increases by 
35.4 percentage points when a loser is 
party chairman in comparison with a 
loser who is not, a remarkable increase 
by any standard.  
                                                 
28 We have also tested if there was an interactive 
effect between being party chair and the past 
electoral share on losers’ repetition. Perhaps 
party chairmen were more prone to repeat than 
those who do not hold that party office the 
smaller the size of the party because the former 
are then more likely to accept the ‘sacrificial-
lamb’ role. It does not seem so (results not 
shown). 
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We can also compare the effect of this 
variable with the relative evolution of 
party results, a continuous variable, by 
comparing their increases in predicted 
probabilities when both variables 
change from ½ standard deviation be-
low base to ½ standard deviation above. 
In the first case the increase is of 18 
percentage points, in the second case of 
12 points, a little lower. 
Finally Graph 3 gives a clearer idea of 
how important controlling the party ma-
chine is on the likelihood of losers run-
ning again. We compare the effect of 
improving in relative terms the party 
results obtained by the losers when they 
are party chair with the same effect when 
they do not hold that party office. In both 
situations, this likelihood increases. But 
we should remark that the chances of 
repeating of a loser who is not party 
chair and improves party results by 50 
per cent are lower than the chances of a 
loser who is party chair but reduces party 
results by 50 per cent. Being party chair 
clearly protects candidates from their 
electoral performance. 
 
Graph 3: Losers’ predicted probabilities of renomination 
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6. Conclusion: extraparliamentary party organization          
still matters  
In this paper we have tried to assess if, 
at least in the case of “New Democra-
cies”, party extraparliamentary organi-
zations do still have a role on the “dura-
bility” of nascent top political leaders in 
front of electoral setbacks. 
We have seen that it is debatable that 
they may still have this role. In parlia-
mentarian democracies the extraparlia-
mentary organizations of the mass par-
ties used to have a primordial role in the 
selection of their executive candidates, 
both in the “selectorate” and in the 
“candidacy” dimensions. But one of the 
consequences of the presidentialization 
of politics would have consisted in a 
reduction of that role in the selection 
criteria, since electoral appeal − and not 
party service − is what main parties 
look for. 
This would have led in turn to an in-
crease of top political leaders’ “auton-
omy” from their own parties, but at the 
same time a loss of “durability” in 
front of electoral setbacks since their 
power is based on a good electoral per-
formance, not on internal power deals. 
If they deliver extra votes and seats, 
they can be extremely powerful politi-
cal figures. But if they fail to do so, or 
their fortune changes, they will be re-
placed by their parties without mercy. 
Still we could expect that current polit-
ical leaders still selected according to 
the old criteria, and in control of the 
extraparliamentary organization, would 
be more “durable”. 
The thesis of the cartelization of politi-
cal parties would suggest, however, that 
the transformation of this party’s role on 
top political careers goes even further. 
This loss of durability would affect not 
only those political leaders selected ac-
cording to the new criteria, as just said, 
but those still entrenched in their par-
ties. Controlling the extraparliamentary 
organization does no longer add a sig-
nificant protection, since this party’s 
“face” has currently lost most of its sa-
lience and power within political par-
ties. 
Still Van Biezen has qualified the valid-
ity of this argument in the case of “New 
Democracies”. She argues that in these 
cases, the extraparliamentary organiza-
tion still is the most important power 
centre within the otherwise cartelized 
political parties. If this is the case, we 
have suggested that the over-time com-
parison can be transformed into a cross-
sectional one. Those executive candi-
dates that still control their party ma-
chines will be more likely to survive, 
and therefore being renominated as 
candidates, if they lose their first elec-
toral contest. 
Using the regional elections in Spain as 
case study we have tried to test empiri-
cally if this was the case.  The data 
clearly shows that Van Biezen’s thesis 
was right. Opposition losers who are 
still party chairmen have a probability 
of running again around 35 percentage 
points higher than their fellow losers 
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who are not. It is true that, ceteris pari-
bus, “improving” electoral results also 
helps losers’ chances of running again. 
But this does not eliminate the salience 
of being party chair. A loser who man-
ages to increase its party share by 50 per 
cent but who does not hold that office 
has still less chances of repeating than a 
loser who controls the extraparliamen-
tary organization but who leads to lose 
50 per cent of its share. 
We have also tried to analyze if this 
effect was a “mirage”. So far, we think 
it is not. It is not the effect of a given 
political party, nor the effect of a given 
Comunidad Autónoma. We have also 
questioned if being party chairman and 
candidate is just the product of the na-
tional party leaders’ desire. We admit 
we do not have good indicators of how 
autonomous the regional branches of 
state-wide parties are. And it seems 
that those candidates who belong to 
non-state wide parties are more prone 
to repeat than the candidates of the 
PSOE.  
We thus conclude that in Spain, as an 
example of a “New Democracy”, the 
presidentialization of politics and the 
cartelization of political parties have not 
involved a loss of salience of the extra-
parliamentary. Controlling this party 
face is still an asset for an incipient top 
political career.   
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